Distinguishes different scientific methods, schools of thought, theories and models of analysis to identify the origin of the backwardness of the economic science and of the sub-performance of national economies. Makes it possible to use this scientific field to establish economic policies and institutional innovations of any ideological matrix. Creates a model of economic analysis normatively neutral (compatible with the institutional scientific method) with institutional and economic agent behavior variables representative of the temporal (passed/present/future) and geographic (specific national economies) diversity of the object of analysis (economy). Can be used as an instrument for the diagnosis (identifying dominant institutions and behaviors) of passed ("historical economy") or present ("positive economy") national economies and as a tool for future planning ("normative economy").
SUMMARY
POST-KEYNESIAN INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS:
SPENDING DECISION STRATEGIES AND SYSTEMS.
INTRODUCTION: the backwardness of economic science and the sub-performance of national economies.
I - THE INSTITUTIONAL SCIENTIFIC METHOD: MODELS OF ANALYSIS WITH INSTITUTIONAL AND ECONOMIC AGENT BEHAVIOR VARIABLES.
1 ) The primitive neoclassic scientific method and the limitations that contribute to the one century backwardness of economic science: models with absolute, abstract, nonhistoric, primitive institutional and economic agent behavior presuppositions.
2 ) The keynesian scientific method and the limitations that avoid the definitive rupture with the neoclassical primitive methodology: models with relative, realistic, historic, modern institutional and economic agent behavior presuppositions.
3 ) The institutional-evolutionist scientific method and the limitations that avoid the definitive rupture with the neoclassic primitive methodology: models with economic agent behavior presuppositions and institutional variables.
4 ) The institutional scientific method: models with institutional and economic agent behavior variables.
II - THE POST-KEYNESIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT:
THE AGGREGATED NOMINAL DEMAND DETERMINES THE AGGREGATED NOMINAL SUPPLY OF GOODS AND SERVICES.
1 ) The post-keynesian school of thought versus the neoclassical school of thought: institutional and economic agent behavior presuppositions.
1 . 1 ) Institutional presupposition: entrepreneurial monetary economy versus barter economy.
1 . 2 ) Economic agent behavior presupposition: security/risk dualism over an uncertain future versus satisfaction/sacrifice dualism over a predictable future.
1 . 3 ) "Principle of effective demand" versus "Say's law:" aggregate nominal demand determines aggregate nominal supply versus "the supply creates its own demand".
2 ) "Neoclassical Synthesis" and the limitations of incorporating and reducing the Keynesian thought to the neoclassical school: inflexibility of prices/wages and other "market imperfections" as the causes of "equilibrium in unemployment" and the addition of supply/demand for money to savings and investment as the determinants of interest rate (IS-LM model).
3 ) Improving the post-keynesian school of thought with the institutional scientific method: models with institutional and economic agent behavior variables.
4 ) Improving the post-keynesian school of thought with models of institutional economic analysis: the need to substitute the limited bidimensional/static mathematical analysis with functions and graphs for multidimensional/dynamic models of institutional analysis of the flow of economic agents spending decisions.
III - THE POST- KEYNESIAN INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMIC MODEL OF ANALYSIS: STRATEGIES AND SYSTEMS OF COORDINATION, COOPERATION, SUBORDINATION AND INNOVATION OF SPENDING DECISIONS OF ECONOMIC AGENTS.
1 ) Spending decisions of economic agents: commanding real resources and securities with securities.
1 . 1 ) Enterprise: intermediary spending unit of decision with the objective of producing private goods and services.
1 . 1 . 1 ) Production decisions: spending decisions in intermediary goods and services.
1 . 1 . 2 ) Investment decisions: spending decisions in capital goods and services.
1 . 1 . 3 ) Financing decisions: spending decisions for the exchange of securities.
1 . 2 ) Individual: final spending unit of decision with the objective of consuming private and public goods and services.
1 . 2 . 1 ) Consumption decisions: spending decisions in final consumer go ods and services.
1 . 2 . 2 ) Work decisions: spending decisions in intermediary goods and services of education, training and means of searching for work.
1 . 2 . 3 ) Entrepreneurial decisions: spending decisions in enterprise pre-operational capital goods and services.
1 . 2 . 4 ) Citizenship decisions: spending decisions in government taxes and electoral party contributions.
1 . 2 . 5 ) Financing decisions: spending decisions for the exchange of securities.
1 . 3 ) Government: intermediary spending unit of decision with the objective of producing public goods and services.
1 . 3 . 1 ) Production decisions: spending decisions in intermediary goods and services.
1 . 3 . 2 ) Investment decisions: spending decisions in capital goods and services.
1 . 3 . 3 ) Financing decisions: spending decisions for the exchange of securities.
2 ) Spending power of economic agents: issuing, accumulation and exchange of securities.
2 . 1 ) Credit: present power of command of real resources and securities in exchange for future power of command of real resources and securities.
2 . 2 ) Credit securitization: decomposing credit contracts in negotiable securities allows increase of liquidity and portfolio diversification.
2 . 3 ) Issuing of securities ("primary market"): issuing of securities without income, securities with fixed income and securities with variable income for commanding real resources and securities.
2 . 4 ) Liquidity of securities ("secondary market"): capacity to exchange future power of command over real resources for present power of command over real resources without a significant loss of spending power above the expectation of premium of the securities.
2 . 5 ) Premium of securities ("interest", "profit" and "royalty"): addition to the future power of command over real resources relative to present power of command over real resources compensating the agent for abdicating of liquidity.
2 . 6 ) Accumulation of securities ("portfolio"): reserve of spending power for the future command of real resources and securities.
3 ) Spending decision strategies of economic agents: criteria for the selection of alternative spending and systems of spending decisions.
3 . 1 ) Cost reduction: increasing the power of command over real resources and securities per unit of spending power.
3 . 1 . 1 ) Economies of scale: cost reduction from aggregating spending in activities with similar variable costs.
3 . 1 . 2 ) Economies of scope: cost reduction from aggregating spending in activities with similar fixed costs.
3 . 1 . 3 ) Economies of transaction: cost reduction from the execution of spending between dependent agents instead of independent agents.
3 . 1 . 4 ) Economies of bargaining: cost reduction from comparing costs of alternative independent agent suppliers/buyers or from increasing bargaining power in relation to independent agent suppliers/buyers.
3 . 1 . 5 ) Economies of externalities: cost reduction from spending of other economic agents.
3 . 1 . 6 ) Economies of confidence: cost reduction from decreasing risks from spending susceptible to probability calculus.
3 . 2 ) Increasing differentiation: spending in specialized products and services.
3 . 3 ) Increasing spending power: spending in accordance with credibility or conditions of credit.
3 . 4 ) Spending power distribution: income distribution from spending.
3 . 5 ) Reduction of uncertainty: subjective reduction of risks not susceptible to probability calculus.
3 . 6 ) Institutional and technological adaptation: adopt dominant technologies, strategies and systems of spending decisions.
3 . 7 ) Institutional and technological innovation: adopt non-dominant technologies, strategies and systems of spending decisions or create new ones.
4 ) Economic agent spending decision systems: processes of transmission of spending decisions between economic agents.
4 . 1 ) Spending decision coordination systems: economic agents maintain decision independence ("market").
4 . 1 . 1 ) Spot contract system: instantaneous command over real resources.
A ) Prefixed spot contracts ("wholesale/retail"): enterprise spending decisions based on estimates of consumer/enterprise spending decisions with adjustment by the way of the posterior fluctuation of inventory (prefixed prices; prefixed production quantities; inventory fluctuates).
B ) Postfixed spot contracts ("auction"): enterprise spending decisions based on estimates of consumer/enterprise spending decisions with adjustment by the way of the posterior fluctuation of prices (post-fixed prices; prefixed production quantities; price fluctuates to clear inventories).
C ) Synchronized spot contracts ("just-in-time"): enterprise spending decisions synchronized with consumer/enterprise spending decisions (prefixed prices; production quantities synchronized with sold quantities; minimum inventories).
4 . 1 . 2 ) Future contract system: future command over real resources.
A ) Prefixed future contracts ("made to order"): enterprise spending decisions based on previous spending decisions of consumers/enterprises (prefixed prices and quantities; minimum inventory).
B ) Postfixed future contracts ("indexed made to order"): enterprise spending decisions based on previous quantitative spending decisions of consumers/enterprises and indexed prices (postfixed prices; prefixed quantities; minimum inventory).
C ) Synchronized future contracts ("prepaid future consumption"): enterprise spending decisions based on previous spending decisions of consumers/enterprises with advanced payment (prefixed prices; prefixed quantities; minimum inventory; spending synchronized with income).
4 . 1 . 3 ) Coordination State: signaling/inducing decisions of independent economic agents by the way of spot, future and synchronized contract systems.
4 . 2 ) Spending decision cooperation systems: independent economic agents lose partially their decision independence.
4 . 2 . 1 ) Joint-ventures: independent enterprises cooperate in spending decisions on a common entrepreneurial project.
4 . 2 . 2 ) Merger: independent enterprises merge together with a proportional division of decision power and make certain spending decisions together.
4 . 2 . 3 ) Cartels: independent enterprises from the same industry cooperate with specific strategies of spending decisions.
4 . 2 . 4 ) Cooperatives: independent enterprises from the same industry cooperate with specific spending decisions.
4 . 2 . 5 ) Subcontracting: independent enterprises cooperate with suppliers with specific spending decisions.
4 . 2 . 6 ) Franchising: independent "model-enterprise" cooperates with independent "clone-enterprise" in broad spending decisions.
4 . 2 . 7 ) Cooperation State: state cooperates with independent economic agents.
4 . 3 ) Spending decision subordination systems: independent economic agents lose totally their decision independence.
4 . 3 . 1 ) Horizontal trusts: enterprises subordinate other enterprises in the same sector of activity.
4 . 3 . 2 ) Vertical trusts: enterprises subordinate other enterprises in the sectors above or below in the productive chain.
4 . 3 . 3 ) Subordinator state: governments subordinate the spending decisions of other agents.
4 . 4 ) Spending decision innovation systems: agents create or substitute dominant spending decision strategies, spending decision systems, products and production processes for new or non-dominant alternative options.
4 . 4 . 1 ) Innovative ventures: individuals form enterprises to develop innovative projects.
4 . 4 . 2 ) Innovative intra-ventures: enterprises develop innovative projects.
4 . 4 . 3 ) Incubation of innovative ventures: enterprises/government/universities form independent enterprises to develop innovative projects.
IV - POST-KEYNESIAN INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY: REDUCING UNCERTAINTY BY THE WAY OF COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC AGENTS SPENDING DECISIONS.
1 ) Institutional diagnosis: identifying dominant agents, strategies and systems of spending decisions in a national economy as a basis to establish efficient economic policies.
2 ) Institutional policy: democratization of financing decisions and development of national synchronized spot and future contract spending decision coordination systems.
3 ) Monetary policy: diversifying security reserve systems and open market operations buying/selling securities against/favoring the national economy, primary and/or secondary market of securities cycles.
4 ) Fiscal policy: progressive direct tax system with increasing/decreasing public spending, selective tax deductions and rates against/favoring the national economic cycle.
5 ) Foreign exchange and tariffs policy: global currency-portfolio with counter cycle buying/selling of foreign securities portfolio-index.
6 ) Capital and income policy: increasing/decreasing individual account social security/investment contribution rates over income and sector consumption favoring the national economic cycle.
7 ) Technology and industrial policy: choosing index-portfolios of securities which determine the composition of social security, government and central bank funds.
V - POST-KEYNESIAN INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMIC INNOVATION: DEVELOPING COORDINATION SYSTEMS AND STRATEGIES OF SPENDING DECISIONS FOR INDEPENDENT AGENTS.
1 ) Central bank of reserve and custody of electronic securities: increasing liquidity, diversifying and democratizing the property of securities with reduction of volatility and uncertainty.
2 ) National direct electronic exchange: direct trade of securities between economic agents.
3 ) Financial card: means of payment, buying power reserve and spending decision information.
CONCLUSION: The model of post-keynesian institutional economic analysis allows the identification of spending decision dominant agents, strategies and systems as a basis to establish efficient institutional economic policies and innovation of any ideological matrix.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
